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Terminally Ill and Pregnant: State Denial of a
Woman's Right to Refuse a Cesarean
Section*
If any thing is sacred the human body is sacred.
I Sing the Body Electric
Walt Whitman
INTRODUCTION

As an increasing number of American doctors have been performing
cesarean deliveries,' an alarming trend toward court-ordered cesareans
has emerged.2 So far, courts have ordered cesareans in at least sixteen
*

I am grateful to Professor Isabel Marcus, Dr. Harlan Spitz, Professor Peter L. Strauss, and

Alison Wetherfield of NOW LDEF for their comments, assistance and encouragement. This article
is dedicated to the memory of Betty F. Handler.
1. In 1970, 5.5% of all American deliveries were by cesarean section. See NATIONAL INST. OF
HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 82-2067, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH: REPORT OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 6 (1981)[hereinafter CESAREAN
CHILDBIRTH]. In 1980, the rate of cesarean deliveries had risen to 16.5%. See Havercamp & Orleans, An Assessment of Electronic FetalMonitoring, 7 WOMEN & HEALTH 115, 127 (1982). In 1985,
the rate reached 22.7%. See Taffel, Placek & Liss, Trends in the United States Cesarean Section Rate
and Reasonsfor the 1980-1985 Rise, 77 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 955, 955-59 (1987).
2. For examples of the growing consensus that many cesareans are unnecessary, see THE BOsTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES (1984); Y.
BRACKBILL, J. RICE & D. YOUNG, BIRTHTRAP: THE LEGAL Low-DOWN ON HIGH-TECH OBSTETRICS (1984); G. CASSIDY-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, WOMEN-CENTERED PREGNANCY
AND BIRTH (1984); M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, RECLAIMING BIRTH: HISTORY AND HEROINES
OF AMERICAN CHILDBIRTH REFORM (1984); S. ROMALIS, CHILDBIRTH: ALTERNATIVES TO MEDI-

(1981); Corea, The CesareanEpidemic, MOTHER JONES, July 1980, at 28.
For examples of court-ordered cesareans, see In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987); Jefferson v.
Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); In re Maydun, Daily
Wash. L. Rptr., Oct. 29, 1986, at 2233, col. 3 (D.C. July 26, 1986); In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004
(Jackson County, Mich. P. Ct. May 24, 1982); In re Ann Miller, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term (Onondaga County, July 3, 1982)(on file at HARV, WOMEN'S L.J.) cited in Gallagher, PrenatalInvasions &
Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARVARD WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987). But see In re
Unborn Robles, No. J-935192 (L.A. Super. Ct., Juv. Div., Sept. 198 l)(unpublished opinion)(holding
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to compel a cesarean for the sake of the fetus where a woman dying
of cancer asked to be treated first in the event of cardiac arrest).
One of the difficulties with these cases is that the crisis nature of maternal-fetal conflicts often
leads to shotgun court orders, which then go unreported and are rarely appealed. Thus, serious due
process violations pass unchallenged. These violations often include the absence of timely prior notice, adequate representation, explicit standards of proof, and right of appeal. See Gallagher, supra,
at 48-49. See also Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983). Although the facts of In re
CAL CONTROL
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cases, denying orders to force medical treatment on pregnant women in
at least six other cases.3 Considering the crisis conditions in which these

cases arise, it is likely that others have gone unreported. Known cases
have occurred in Colorado, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii,

Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Washington.

Typically, a court faces the question of whether to order a cesarean
when a woman in labor in her third trimester of pregnancy decides for
medical or religious reasons not to undergo the cesarean section her doctor recommended. The doctor does not have the right to force treatment
on a patient. At this point, motivated by genuine concern about malprac-

tice liability, the doctor or hospital often asks a court to authorize the
surgery.
A 1987 case, In re A. C.,4 has added a new wrinkle to the growing
debate over legally coerced medical treatment for pregnant women. 5 In
this case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the trial

court's decision ordering a terminally ill, pregnant woman to submit to a
cesarean in a futile attempt to save her twenty-six week old fetus. The

court of appeals held that the state interest in the potential life of the
A. C. reveal clear due process violations, the relevant due process arguments are beyond the scope of
this Note. For this line of argument, see Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 45-49, In re
A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No. 87-609)[hereinafter Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits].
3. In their study, Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons found fourteen cases of court-ordered cesarean
section. Court-orderedObstetricalInterventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1192 (1987); Brief of
Amici Curiae, the National Organization for Women, Legal Defense and Education Fund et al., in
Support of the Appellant at 14, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 6, 1988)(No. 87-609)[hereinafter Brief of
Amici Curiae, NOW LDEF et al., in Support of the Appellant]. The Kolder study does not include
two other cases: In reA.C, 533 A.2d at 611, and In reMaydun, Daily Wash. L. Rptr., Oct, 29, 1986,
at 2233, col. 3. The National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund [hereinafter NOW LDEF] claims that there are at least twenty of these cases. NOW LDEF, Women's Reproductive Rights: Forced Cesarean Sections and Other Forced Treatment of Pregnant Women - An
Assault on Women's Autonomy and Bodily Integrity (July 1989)(available at NOW LDEF, New
York, NY).
4. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
5. General articles on this topic include: Gallagher, supranote 2; Johnsen, The Creationof Fetal
Rights: Conflicts With Women's Constitutional Rights; Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95
YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Nelson, Buggy & Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
"Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest", 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 753-62 (1986);
Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-OrderedCesareans,74 CALIF. L,
REV. 1951, 1989-94 (1986); Note, The FetalPatient and the UnwillingMother: A Standardfor Judicial Intervention, 14 PAc. L.J. 1065 (1983); Note, ConstitutionalLimitationson State Intervention in
Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Limitations]; Note,
Family Law - Court-OrderedSurgeryfor the Protectionof a Viable Fetus, 5 W. NE~w ENO. L. REV.
125 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Court-OrderedSurgery].
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6
fetus outweighed the woman's fundamental right to bodily integrity.

Although the woman and her family were united in their opposition to
surgery,7 the court chose to subject her to it for the sake of the fetus.
Both the woman and the fetus died.'
In March 1988, the court vacated its original order and granted rehearing of the case en banc.9 The parties, Angela Carder (the woman),' °
Lindsay Marie Carder (the infant), George Washington University Medical Center, and the District of Columbia, submitted briefs on the issue of
mootness and on the merits,1" as did numerous amici curiae. 2 Although
the court heard oral argument on September 22, 1988, no further decision issued until April 26, 1990.
Conflicts between a woman's needs and those of her fetus are vexing
because they pit powerful cultural norms against one another: the ideal
of autonomy and the ideal of maternal self-sacrifice. Although our law is
based on individual rights, it is not surprising that courts feel comfortable forcing mothers to relinquish these rights for the sake of their children."3 The ideal of the Good Mother is so imbedded in our collective
consciousness that courts feel justified in demanding maternal self-sacri6. 533 A.2d at 617: "Accordingly, we concluded that the trial judge did not err in subordinating
A.C.'s right against bodily intrusion to the interests of the unborn child and the state, and hence we
denied the motion for stay." In so doing, the court of appeals overrode A.C.'s constitutional rights
and the doctrine of informed consent.
7. During the hospital hearing, A.C.'s mother stated "Let the baby die with her." A.C.'s husband concurred, "Please." See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 8 n. 11, In re A.C. (D.C.
filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No. 87-609)(citing Record at 60).
8. See infra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text.
9. In re A.C., 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988). The court released its final decision as this article was
going to press, upholding a pregnant woman's right to decide the course of medical treatment for
herself and for her fetus. In re A.C., No. 87-609 (D.C. Apr. 26, 1990) (unpublished at press time).
See Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
10. Mrs. Carder is represented by her court-appointed counsel of record, and the American
Civil Liberties Union.
11. NOW LDEF, 1987-88 Case Docket and Other Professional Activities 1 (Nov. 16,
1988)(available at NOW LDEF, New York, NY).
12. Amicus curiaeinclude the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and NOW LDEF, which submitted a brief on the merits on behalf of sixty-nine women's
organizations (including itself) in support of Mrs. Carder.
13. Underlying the court-ordered cesarean cases is a notion that mothers have special obligations to their children, and the judges seem to equate pregnant women with mothers, and fetuses
with born children. I find it misleading to call a pregnant woman and a fetus, a mother and child,
prior to birth. Before birth, the woman can relate only to her fantasies of who the child will be. Only
after birth can she begin to relate to the child as the unique individual he or she is. I see a crucial
distinction between these two states, and prefer to call a woman a "mother" only after she embarks
upon this individualized relationship. After all, when the woman loses the fetus in miscarriage, we
do not call her a "mother." If there is a special obligation, I feel that an individualized relationship is
a prerequisite for it.
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fice, even of a terminally ill woman whose fetus has little chance of survival.' 4 But this is far from equitable. If the law is to treat women as
men's equals it must afford women and men the same measure of individual autonomy. Parents who make sacrifices for their children should be
encouraged, even lauded, but the law should not require such sacrifices.
Self-sacrifice is a gift. Forcing a pregnant woman to sacrifice her health
for her fetus is simply slavery.
When faced with medical emergencies where a woman and her fetus
are endangered, decision-makers confront personal feelings about the
highly charged area of reproduction.1 5 Thus, it is important to stress the
legal principles establishing a woman's right to refuse a bodily intrusion.
Otherwise, emotions rather than principles will dictate our law. For no
matter how powerful our urge to create new life, the dying cannot be
abandoned. While they live, they deserve humane treatment, and they
must not be stripped of their rights so that another might live.
The facts of In re A. C. distressed many in the women's rights and
medical communities and brought some media attention to the issue of
court-ordered cesareans. This Note seeks to draw further attention to the
A. C. case to illustrate the dangerous consequences of allowing court-ordered treatment for pregnant women.
Section I describes and critiques the facts and the reasoning used by
the trial court and the court of appeals to reach their decisions. It is
contended that justice required the consideration of key facts ignored by
these courts. Furthermore, it is argued that the courts could not properly
analyze this case without addressing three applicable bodies of law, none
of which support a court-ordered cesarean in this tragic situation. The
remaining sections of this Note explain these bodies of law and apply
them to A. C..
Section II examines the constitutional status of the woman and the
fetus set forth in Roe v. Wade 6 and its progeny, as these cases apply to
coercive cesareans. This Note contends that the courts have misapplied
14. "[T]he child's chances of survival were grim." In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C. 1987).
15. See Nelson & Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Life, Liberty &
Law in Conflict 259 JAMA 1060, 1061 (1988):
Perhaps nowhere are the physician's frustration and pain with a patient's noncompliance
more excruciating than in obstetrics, where the decisions of the pregnant woman affect
not only her own health but also that of her fetus. However, these feelings alone do not
ethically justify ignoring or circumventing a pregnant woman's refusal to follow medical
advice.
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court has recently narrowed the doctrines of Roe in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), but this case is beyond the scope of
this Note. Although the Webster Court exhibited some willingness to abandon the Roe trimester
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this crucial body of precedent. Section III considers the common law
doctrine of informed consent and the medical refusal cases used to defend court-ordered cesareans. As for section IV, it discusses an analogy
between prenatal surgery for the benefit of the fetus, and bone marrow
transplant cases where one relative is asked to undergo medical procedures for the sake of another, as a third way of analyzing these decisions.
Finally, this Note calls for a renewed respect for pregnant women's ethical and health decisions about their medical treatment.
I. INREA.C.
A. Facts and Holding
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in In re A. C. that a
terminally ill, pregnant woman's right against bodily intrusion was properly subordinated to the interests of her unborn child and the state.17
The issue arose in June 1987, when George Washington University
Hospital sought a declaratory judgment 8 as to whether it could perform
a cesarean section on a terminally ill, pregnant patient who had refused
her consent to the operation. The patient, Angela Carder, had been diagnosed with leukemia at age thirteen. 19 She married at the age of twentyseven, after her cancer had been in remission for three years, and she
became pregnant. At twenty five weeks of pregnancy, on June 9, 1987,
she reported shortness of breath and back pain at a regular prenatal
check-up at George Washington University Hospital's High Risk Pregnancy Clinic, and the examination revealed a tumor in her lung. 0 She
also consulted her long-term care physician, Dr. Moscow, a cancer specialist from the National Institute of Health.2 1 On June 11, 1987, "[s]he
framework, it has not yet done so. Furthermore, the maternal life and health exception, upon which
I base my argument, emerged from the Webster decision unchanged.
17. 533 A.2d 611, 617 (D.C. 1987).
18. The hospital petitioned the court for declaratory relief, but in asking the court to order
medical treatment for the fetus, it actually sought injunctive relief. See Appellant's Amended Brief
on the Merits at 4 n.5, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No. 87-609).
19. The court of appeals called her condition "leukemia." In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C.
1987). Amici curiaeexplain that she was diagnosed with Ewings sarcoma, a cancer of the connective
tissue of the left thigh, and treated at the National Cancer Institute of the National Institute of
Health during the 1970s. In 1984, she developed a second malignancy, an osteosarcoma, which was
treated successfully through chemotherapy and the amputation of her left leg and part of her pelvis.
Brief of Amici Curiae,NOW LDEF et al., in Support of the Appellant at 3, In re A.C. (D.C. filed
Sept. 6, 198g)(No. 87-609).
20. 533 A.2d at 612.
21. See Brief of Amici Curiae, NOW LDEF, at 3 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 9-10,
filed Nov. 10, 1987).
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was admitted to the hospital... and her prognosis was terminal."2 2

The N.I.H. cancer specialist conferred with his colleagues at the National Institute of Cancer that same day to plan treatment for Mrs.

Carder.23 Based upon this consultation and his knowledge of Mrs.
Carder's case, he elected chemotherapy and radiation therapy to tempo-

rarily improve her condition.24 On balance, he felt that these therapies
posed less risk to the fetus than an untreated tumor, and if he could
sustain Mrs. Carder's life beyond her twenty-eighth week of pregnancy,

the chances of fetal survival would significantly improve.25
Since the cancer specialist did not have admitting privileges at G.W.

Hospital, he discussed his treatment proposal with a number of G.W.
physicians so that they might carry it out.26 Despite six discussions with
Mrs. Carder's long-term specialist, the G.W. physicians neither commenced treatment, nor informed Dr. Moscow that his patient had received no treatment.2 7 Meanwhile Mrs. Carder's tumor grew

uncontrolled.2"

On the afternoon of June 15, having discovered that the hospital had

administered no treatment, the cancer specialist visited Mrs. Carder and
observed her condition.2 9 He consulted with her attending physicians,

and all the doctors gathered in her room with her mother.30 Because of
the cancer specialist's long-standing relationship with Mrs. Carder, the
other doctors asked him to explain her condition and treatment options
to her.3 1 Dr. Moscow told her that he believed the fetus too premature to
survive outside the womb, but that a few more weeks would increase its
chances.3 2
22. 533 A.2d at 612.
23. See Briefof Amici Curiae, NOW LDEF, at 3 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 1315).
24. Id. at 3-4 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 15-17).
25. Id. at 4 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 17). See also 533 A.2d at 612.
26. See Brief of Amici Curiae, NOW LDEF, at 4 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow
generally).
27. Id. (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 18, 20, 24, 27, 33).
28. Id. at 5 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 12, 19, 20, 22, 24-25).
29. Id. (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 30-34).
30. Id:
First we went into her room, and Dr. Lessin examined Ms. C. Then we stepped out and
talked in the hallway outside her room. Dr. Lessin agreed that Mrs. C. was in significant
respiratory distress. I again advocated therapy for Mrs. C., although at this point I felt
we had fewer options than we had had on Friday, June 12. It was clear that any therapy
at this point carried a higher risk now that Ms. C. was more ill.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Although short of breath, Mrs. Carder indicated that she understood the plan to attempt to extend her life, and consented to chemotherapy and radiation treatment.3 3 These therapies would have relieved her
pain and perhaps enabled her to continue her pregnancy. 34 At no time
did any doctor suggest a cesarean section, nor did Mrs. Carder request or
consent to one.35 Later that evening, Mrs. Carder's condition worsened
and she agreed to sedation and intubation to ease her breathing.36 She
expressed no desire to alter the treatment plan.3 7
Concluding that she had only days to live, the G.W. medical staff
did not administer radiation or chemotherapy. Instead, on June 16,
George Washington University's general counsel requested a District of
Columbia Superior Court hearing at the hospital. 38 He asked the court to
determine whether the legal interests of the fetus justified delivering it by
cesarean.39 According to the court of appeals, the medical staff supported
only "passive treatment," believing that the "chances of [fetal] survival
were grim."'
That same day, in a hearing at the hospital, the superior court appointed separate counsel for Mrs. Carder and for the fetus.4" The District
of Columbia intervened in its capacity as parenspatriae for the fetus.4 2
No one questioned Mrs. Carder's competency to consent to medical
treatment, nor did the court seek or appoint a guardian for her. 3 Mrs.
Carder was not notified of the hearing until it was in progress,' and she
was not asked to consent to surgery until after the judge made his
33. "She indicated that she understood all the information she had been told. I felt that she
agreed to treatment and to the approach of trying to extend her life, to give birth to her baby and
possibly to go home with it." Id.
34. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C. 1987).
35. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 4, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No.
87-609).
36. Id. (citing Record at 47, 50).
37. Id. (citing Record at 52-53, 67-68).
38. Id. at 4-5 (citing Record at 6, 63, 82).
39. Id. at 5-6 (citing Record at 5-6).
40. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C. 1987).
41. Id.
42. Id. See also Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 5. Later when supporting the Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, the District of Columbia suggested that, as the state, it may have
played an inappropriate role by representing the fetus. Id. n.7 (citing Response to Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 7(filed Feb. 3, 1988).
43. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 5, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No.
87-609).
44. See Brief of,4mici Curiae, NOW LDEF et al., in Support of the Appellant at 6, In re A.C.
(D.C. filed Sept. 6, 1988)(No. 87-609).
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decision.
The trial judge presumed that Mrs. Carder would not consent to a
cesarean based upon uncontroverted testimony by her doctors and her
mother. According to them, Mrs. Carder had never wished to compromise her own health, and she had expressed a desire to avoid premature
delivery because of the risk of birth defects.46 After hearing medical testimony on Mrs. Carder's dire condition 7 and conflicting testimony on fetal viability," the trial judge ordered the hospital to operate. He did not
attempt to see Mrs. Carder although invited to the ward by one of the
doctors. 4 9

The hospital did not notify Dr. Moscow of the hearing. In an affidavit submitted afterwards, the cancer specialist declared that he would
have hurried to the hospital to testify that "a cesarean section was medically inadvisable for both Angela and the fetus" and that "Angela was
not terminally ill."5 0
In a telephone conference call appeal, the court of appeals denied
Mrs. Carder's motion for a stay, and the cesarean was performed. The
baby died two hours after delivery. 1 Mrs. Carder died two days later.5 2
45. Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 18 (citing Record at 89). See infra note 80.
46. Id. at 6 (citing Record at 14). Dr. Hamner, Mrs. Carder's attending and primary physician
at G.W. testified:
She's been through major surgery, multiple episodes of radiation and chemotherapy and
in and out of the hospital most of her life since the age of thirteen, and we have discussed
the potential effects on the baby at delivery premature, not in any specific gestational
age, but she understood the increased risk of cerebral palsy, neurological defects, hearing
loss, blindness, that can go along with premature delivery. My feeling from the ten or
eleven weeks that I have known her, she would not want to bring a baby into this world
that potentially would have to undergo those type problems. [sic]
Id.
47. Id. at 10-11. Dr. Hamner testified that without any further treatment Mrs. Carder would die
within twenty-four hours, but that she was not "comatose." Id. at 11. He did not testify as to
whether treatment could have improved her condition.
48. Id. at 12-14. Dr. Hamner testified that a normal twenty-six week fetus had between a 50 and
60 percent chance of survival. However, Mrs. Carder's fetus had been exposed to multiple medications and an abnormal electrolyte acid base environment. During the night it had probably suffered
from chronic asphyxiation and was showing tachycardia (excessively rapid heartbeat). In his view,
all of these factors tended to increase morbidity. Id. at 12-13.
49. The hospital administrator, Dr. Minogue, offered to take the judge upstairs to speak with
Mrs. Carder, but the judge did not go. Id. at 20 (citing Record at 87-88, 90).
50. Id. at 15 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow at 2, filed Nov. 10, 1987).
51. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1988, at A17, col. 1.
52. L.A. Times, Dec. 25, 1987, § 5A, at 5, col. 1. At a December 1987 press conference, Mrs.
Carder's mother, Nettie Stoner, said that after this ordeal her daughter lost the will to live: "After
the surgery and after they told her the baby was dead, I think Angie just gave up." Id. Mrs, Carder's
death certificate lists "status post-Cesarean section" as a contributing cause of death, See Appellant's
Amended Brief on the Merits at 22 n.36 (citing Certificate of Death of Angela Carder, June 18, 1988
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In November 1987, the court of appeals released an opinion to explain
the basis of its emergency
ruling, acknowledging that it may have short53
ened Mrs. Carder's life.
B. Reasoning
The superior court ruled from the bench, balancing Mrs. Carder's
life against that of the fetus based on its findings of fact. 4 According to
the court, the fetus was viable, Mrs. Carder was unconscious with only
twenty-four to forty-eight hours to live, and her views with respect to the
proposed intervention were "not clearly know[n]." 5 The court was
swayed by arguments advanced by the appointed counsel for the fetus
and the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel that it should give

little weight
to Mrs. Carder's constitutional rights because she was
56

dying.
In its opinion, the court of appeals explained that the superior court
had based its decision on the viability of the fetus. 7 Citing Roe v.
Wade,58 the superior court had reasoned that the state's interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus became compelling at the point of
viability. Relying on a 1986 District of Columbia Superior Court case, In
filed as Supplementation of the Record by court-appointed attorney for "Carder Fetus" on July 1,
1988).
53. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. 1987).
54. Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 17 (citing Record at 82-85). The D.C. Court of
Appeals explained the Superior Court's balancing thus:
The court based its decision to deny a stay on the medical judgment that A.C. would
not survive for a signifidant time after the surgery and that the fetus had a better, though
slim, chance if taken [out] before A.C.'s imminent death.
533 A.2d at 613 (emphasis added). The court of appeals also used a medical balancing test: "The
child, on the other hand, had a chance of surviving delivery, despite the possibility that it would be
born handicapped." 533 A.2d at 617.
55. Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 17 (citing Record at 83-84). The court also
stated that there was uncontroverted medical testimony that the fetus had approximately a 50-60
percent chance of survival, that the risks of handicaps were possibly less than 20 percent and that the
hospital could perform the cesarean with an 80 percent survival rate after delivery of such a fetus. Id.
at 17, n.28. All of these findings were debatable.
56. Id. at 16. The D.C. Corporation Counsel contended that "the mother will die regardless of
what we do, and under those circumstances the interest to protect the fetus becomes even more
compelling." Id. (citing Record at 75). Mrs. Carder's attorney, Mr. Sylvester, countered that if the
court ordered a cesarean "we would in effect be terminating her life..." The judge replied, "She's
going to die, Mr. Sylvester."
Interrupting the proceedings, Mrs. Carder's husband voiced the crncial question in this case:
"Who is to say she is going to die?" Id. at 16-17 (citing Record at 76)(emphasis added).
57. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 614-15 (D.C. 1987).
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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re Maydun,59, the superior court found this interest sufficiently compelling to override the mother's constitutionally protected privacy interest.
In Maydun, the superior court had also ordered a cesarean, but in a different fact situation. Unlike Mrs. Carder, Mrs. Maydun was a healthy
woman at term, whose sixty hour labor had put the fetus at risk of death

or brain damage. A Muslim, Mrs. Maydun opposed cesarean surgery for
religious reasons. The superior court found that the hospital should use

all necessary procedures "to preserve and protect the birth and safety of
the fetus." 60
The court of appeals, however, based its opinion on broader author-

ity than the trial court. The court of appeals acknowledged that this was
a case of first impression. 6 ' Only one other appellate court in the nation
had ordered a cesarean performed,6 2 and on such divergent facts that this
case was "of limited help."6 3 The court distinguished Roe v. Wade,
stressing that abortion was not at issue here. It suggested that once a

woman had decided not to exercise her right to a timely abortion, she
assumed certain obligations to the fetus.' Having distinguished Roe, the

court nonetheless drew from it the concept that after viability, the
mother's interest had to be balanced against other state interests. In a

footnote, 65 the court rejected the argument that two United States
Supreme Court decisions barred courts from forcing a woman to risk her
life or health to save the life of a fetus.6 6
59. In re Maydun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1986). The
Mayduns' sincere religious belief that the surgery was unnecessary was overridden by the "undisputed opinion of a skilled and trained physician" that the fetus was in danger. Id. at 2240.
60. Id. See also 533 A.2d at 613 n.l.
61. 533 A.2d at 614.
62. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
63. 533 A.2d at 614. In Jefferson, the woman was at term and had a condition called placenta
previa. The court found that vaginal delivery held a 99% risk of fetal death and a 50% risk of
maternal death, and ordered a cesarean over religious objections to protect both the woman and the
fetus. 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458. However, after sheriff's deputies brought Mrs. Jefferson to
the hospital her placenta previa condition began to correct itself. She delivered by normal childbirth.
See Note, Court-Ordered Surgery, supra note 4, at 138 n.89.
64. 533 A.2d. at 614. For an analysis of an attempt to criminalize conduct during pregnancy
that might harm the fetus, see Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case and Fetal Harm: Prosecution or
Prevention? 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 227 (1988). Fetal rights advocates argue that a pregnant woman has "a duty to assure that the fetus is born as healthy as possible." Robertson, The Rig/it to
Procreateand In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. OF LEGAL MED. 333, 352 (1982). See generally, Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV.
405, 448-49 (1983).
65. 533 A.2d at 615 n.4.
66. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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Turning to the woman's interest, the court characterized it as a fundamental right to bodily integrity encompassed within the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of the right to privacy.67 The court
cited a California Court of Appeals decision strongly supporting a competent adult's right to make medical treatment decisions. 6 As the court

pointed out, the right to bodily integrity includes a right to refuse consent to medical treatment. 69 A patient may refuse even life-saving treat-

ment, and the state interest in preserving life generally will not prevail
70
over this refusal.
Nevertheless, the court found that the state's countervailing interest

in protecting innocent third parties from a patient's decision to refuse
medical treatment may outweigh the right to bodily integrity.7 1 Using

this reasoning, courts have prevented parents from exercising their freedom of religion to deny their children life-saving medical treatment.72
The A. C. court noted that some jurisdictions have extended this doctrine

to fetuses, as well. 7' As the court explained, though, ordering treatment
67. 533 A.2d at 615.
68. 533 A.2d at 615 (citing Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.App.3d 186, 209 Cal.Rptr. 220
(holding that competent adults have the right to have life support equipment disconnected over
physicians' objections)).
69. 533 A.2d at 615 (citing In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972)(where court upheld religious freedom to refuse blood tranfusion and would not appoint guardian to grant consent); In re
Melideo, 88 Misc.2d 974,390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976)(where court refused to order transfusion
over objection of competent, non-pregnant woman although she risked death)).
70. 533 A.2d at 615-16 (citing John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d
921 (Fla. 1984), 94 A.L.R. 4th 799 (comatose, terminally ill patient permitted to terminate life support pursuant to "living will"); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344-50, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-23
(1985)(guardian of incompetent nursing home patient permitted to direct withdrawal of life support
where patient would have refused treatment if competent)).
71. 533 A.2d at 616 (citing Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(Although theA.C court cites
Prince,the Prince case does not concern the state interest in protecting innocent third parties from a
patient's decision to refuse medical treatment. Rather, Prince involved a child distributing religious
literature in the company of her guardian in violation of the child labor laws. Addressing a First
Amendment free exercise of religion claim, the Supreme Court balanced parental control over chil-

dren against the state's authority to protect children via the child labor laws. The Court held that the
state interest prevailed.).
72. 533 A.2d at 616 (citing Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F.Supp.
488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968)(upholding constitutionality of Washington statutes enabling judges to authorize blood transfusions over parental objections); Muhlenberg Hosp. v.
Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974)(ordering transfusion over parental objection to
prevent irreparable brain damage); In re Philip B., 92 Cal.App.3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979)(ordering surgery for child with congenital heart defect), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); In re Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978)(ordering chemotherapy for child with
leukemia); In re Cicero, 101 Misc.2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup.Ct. 1979)(ordering surgery for
child with spina bifida who would have been handicapped or would perhaps have died without it)).
73. 533 A.2d at 616 (citing Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274
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of children already born does not require an infringement of the mother's
right to control her body. The authority cited shows that the state inter-

est in preserving the life of "innocent third party" born children overrides an adult's right to the free practice of religion. But it does not

automatically follow that the state's interest in the potential life of the
unborn fetus will transcend a pregnant woman's fundamental right to

bodily integrity. Conceding this point, the court turned to balancing
interests.7 4
While it did not articulate any balancing test, the court seemed to
weigh the woman's and the state's competing interests based upon the
relative impact the surgery would have on Mrs. Carder and the fetus. 5

The court relied heavily on the limited medical testimony it heard in
order to make this essentially medical determination.7 6 In a medically
questionable finding,7 7 the court concluded that the stress and complica-

tions of a cesarean section would not "significantly alter [Mrs. Carder's]
prognosis;

whereas, the surgery "had a chance" of saving the fetus.79

The court mentioned several other factors which influenced its decision,
S.E.2d 457 (1981)(see supra note 63); Raleigh-Fitkin Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537 (1964)(ordering court-appointed guardian for fetus to consent to blood transfusions over
pregnant woman's religious objection where maternal and fetal life were in danger), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1965); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc.2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup.Ct. 1985)(appointing physician guardian and ordering him to use any means necessary to preserve fetal life,
including blood transfusions over maternal objection); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc.2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup.Ct. 1985)(ordering pregnant woman to submit to
blood transfusions to improve fetal survivability in a premature delivery)).
74. 533 A.2d at 616-17.
75. Id.
76. Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 6, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No. 87609) shows that this was the purpose of the hearing. The trial court stated in its order:
There's been some testimony that... a Cesarean section may very well hasten the
death of Angela, who is terminally ill and not expected to live another 24 to 48 hours.
There's also testimony that delay in performing the Cesarean section greatly increases
the risk to the fetus and that the prognosis is not great for the fetus to be delivered post
mortem from Angela.
It's not an easy decision to make, but given the choices, the Court is of the view that
the fetus should be given the opportunity to live.
Id. at 17 (citing Record at 84).
77. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
78. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 617. The medical testimony was contradictory but suggested that
a cesarean would shorten her life. She was stricken with cancer, and in that sense, "terminal." However, Dr. Moscow disagreed with the notion that surgery would not "significantly alter" her prognosis. He felt that another treatment option, radiation and chemotherapy, would have prolonged her
life.
79. Id. In retrospect, one can see that Dr. Moscow was correct in his analysis that the fetus was
nonviable and could only be saved by extending the mother's life.
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80
including the allegedly "last-minute" nature of Mrs. Carder's refusal,
and the availability of physicians willing to operate and staff prepared to
care for a premature baby."1
Thus, the court denied Mrs. Carder's motion for a stay and ordered
surgery against her will. In its final remarks, however, it proposed that in
the future a "quasi-official body" should make these emergency decisions
leaving the judiciary to its "appropriate and limited reviewing role." 2

C. A Critique of the Findings of Fact

The court of appeals decision in In re A. C. omits or distorts certain
key facts presented at trial. In its recitation of the facts, the court failed

to clarify that Mrs. Carder was being treated by a team of doctors: both
cancer specialists from the National Institute of Cancer and prenatal specialists from the G.W. High Risk Pregnancy Clinic. The court should
certainly have indicated that the hospital sought a court-ordered
cesarean against the advice of its entire obstetrics and gynecology department. The treating physicians opposed surgery without Mrs. Carder's
informed consent and actually refused to perform the operation against
her wishes. 3 In addition, the opinion failed 4to state that Mrs. Carder's
mother and husband opposed the cesarean.
Although the court stated that if Mrs. Carder died before delivery,
the fetus would also die, there was testimony to the contrary. 5 Mrs.
Carder's primary care obstetrician at G.W. indicated that a "[c]esarean
section could be performed in a timely manner in the event of cardiac
80. Id. Mrs. Carder was not asked to consent until after she had been ordered to submit to
surgery. When Dr. Hamner first consulted with her after the court order, he merely told her that
"it's been deemed we should intervene on behalf of the baby by Cesarean section." See Appellant's
Amended Brief on the Merits at 18 (citing Record at 89). She assented. Later that afternoon he
returned to her bedside to confirm her informed consent, clarifying the fact that a judge, and not her
doctors, had ordered the cesarean. He told her that if she withheld consent he would refuse to
operate, implying that he did not support this treatment plan. At that point she refused her consent.
Dr. Weingold and Mrs. Carder's husband and mother witnessed this second discussion, and Mrs.
Carder was alert and lucid. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 18-20 (citing Record at
89, 92, 93). In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 613 (D.C. 1987).
8 1. Id. This reasoning has bizarre implications. Would Mrs. Carder's refusal of consent have
been accepted had no nursery for premature babies been available? Can courts override the parents'
wishes to put the woman's life first if a hospital staff is willing to assume the care of the fetus? Who
would then be the legal guardian of the premature infant: the hospital or the infant's parents?
82. Id. It is indeed inappropriate for judges to balance the medical prognoses of patients because
they lack the expertise to do so.
83. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 9 (citing Record at 61, 80).
84. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
85. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 613 (D.C. 1987).
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arrest." 6 In its opinion, the court also found the presence of "physicians
willing to operate" a factor supporting its decision. 7 However, the doctors present at the hearing expressed concern about implementing the
order in light of the widespread staff opposition to it."8 Even the Director
of Nurseries at the hospital, who stressed the hospital's excellent record
of treating premature infants, refused to recommend a cesarean. She
stated, "It is a personal choice." 90
Above all, the court's characterization of Mrs. Carder as "twentyfour to forty-eight" hours from death was irresponsible.9" Mrs. Carder
had battled cancer for many years, and she had planned her pregnancy
fully intending to live to hold her baby. 9z As recently as a day before the
hearing, Mrs. Carder's doctors had framed a treatment plan aimed at
sustaining her life for several weeks, and her cancer specialist did not
regard her as "terminal." 93 As long as the fetus lived, she had compelling
motivation to fight the disease. The will to live has kept many cancer
patients alive well beyond their medical prognoses.9 4 In fact, physicians'
life expectancy predictions are so often inaccurate that the court should
have taken judicial notice of this common experience.
II.

THE WOMAN'S LIFE AND HEALTH COME FIRST

In its landmark 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade, the United States
Supreme Court first addressed the conflict which may arise between a
pregnant woman and the fetus within her.95 The Court stated that the
Constitution protects certain zones of privacy from state interference, including personal choices about contraception, 96 procreation, 97 and family
relationships.98 Relying on the principles of these decisions, the Court
86. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 13 (citing Record at 15).
87.

533 A.2d at 617.

88. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 9 (citing Record at 61, 80).
89. Id. at 10 (citing Record at 35, 36).

90. Id. at 10 (citing Record at 43).
91.

In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 613 (D.C. 1987).

92. According to her mother, Mrs. Carder did not consider herself moribund. See Appellant's
Amended Brief on the Merits at 17 n.27 (citing Record at 56).

93. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 15 (citing Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Moscow
at 2, filed Nov. 10, 1987).
94.

I have personal experience of this phenomenon. My grandmother refused to surrender to

multiple myeloma for over a decade and outlived all predictions of her life expectancy.
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For the relevance of Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989), see supra note 16.
96. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
97. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
98. Id. at 153 (citing Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
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held that the right of privacy also encompassed a woman's fundamental
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. 99 Once a right is
deemed fundamental, the state must show a compelling government interest to limit it, and must use the most narrowly drawn legislation suitable for the purpose."
In the case of abortion, the Court found two compelling state interests: preserving the health of the mother, and after the viability point,
protecting the potential life of the fetus.1 The state interest in potential
life gave it the authority to override the woman's privacy interest and
regulate or prohibit the abortion of a viable fetus." 2 But the Court
carved out a crucial exception to this rule: the state could not limit or
proscribe abortions which were "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."' 3
The Court did not explain the reasons for this "life and health of the
mother" exception. Perhaps it thought the reasons obvious. After all, the
most basic and fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to life. The state cannot deprive
a citizen of life without due process of law. Evidently, the Court felt that
the state interest in potential life should never outweigh the state's constitutional obligations to citizens who were already living. The state simply
could not be allowed to risk depriving a citizen of life in order to prevent
an abortion.
Since a cesarean section is a life-threatening procedure, court-ordered cesarean cases also implicate a woman's constitutionally protected
right to life. The state shoulders a heavy burden when it tries to show a
government interest so compelling that it justifies taking or risking a citizen's life. Only two major examples come to mind: the draft often compels citizens to risk their lives, and capital punishment deprives citizens
of life. 1"4
The procedural safeguards limiting the imposition of the death pen99. 410 U.S. at 113. The abortion cases have established intimate reproductive decisions within
the zone of family privacy. See,e.g. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973). State-compelled treatment of pregnant women intrudes into the family relationship and belies the traditional presumption in law that parents are best able to make decisions regarding children. See Gallagher, supra note 2, at 28-31 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
101. Id. at 150.
102. Id. at 155-56.

103. Id. at 165. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973), the Court defined "health" to
include both physical and psychological well-being.
104. Of course, states only use capital punishment for convicted felons after full due process of
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alty illustrate the seriousness of a state-imposed deprivation of life, a
clear risk in every court-ordered cesarean. In Gardner v. Florida, the
Supreme Court explained that "[flrom the point of view of society, the
action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens... differs
dramatically from any other legitimate state action." ' 5 The Court added
that for the individual, the loss of life is different both in its severity and
finality. 10 6 Consequently, before the state may impose on its citizen the
"irreversible penalty of death,"'0 7 it must abide by the highest due process standards to guarantee that the decision is "based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion."1 08 By contrast, Mrs. Carder was denied minimal due process safeguards; for instance, she had no prior notice whatsoever of the hearing which decided her fate.'0 9
As several commentators have argued, the doctrines set forth in Roe
are central to the cesarean debate."' Roe indicates that states should
never require doctors to elevate the welfare of the fetus above the life and
health of the mother.'
Even when the health risk to the woman is not
grave, case law demonstrates that states must allow postviability abortions. The federal courts have struck down statutes which limited third
trimester abortions to women who risked permanent impairment," 2 or
women threatened by "imminent peril" Which "substantially endanger[ed]" their life and health." 3 Third trimester abortions often lead to
fetal death, but where there is a legitimate health risk to the woman, the
law dictates that concern for the fetus must be subordinated.
Furthermore, state regulations of late abortions must spell out the
primacy of the mother's life and health in order to pass constitutional
scrutiny. In a 1979 case, Colautti v. Franklin, the Supreme Court found
the standard of care provision of a Pennsylvania statute void for vagueness.1 4 The statute demanded that physicians performing postviability
law. Nonetheless, it has certainly been argued that both conscription and capital punishment constitute unjustifiable state deprivations. But, these issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
105. 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977).
106. 430 U.S. at 357.
107. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 (1976).
108. 430 U.S. 358.
109. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
110. See Gallagher, supra note 2; Johnsen, supra note 5; Nelson, supra note 5; Rhoden, supra
note 5.
111. Rhoden supranote 5, at 1989-94 (exploring in some depth the argument that the woman's
life and health come first).
112. Margaret S.v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181, 196 (E.D. La. 1980).
113. Schulte v. Douglas, 567 F.Supp. 522, 525 (D.Neb. 1981), aff'd sub noma.
Women's Servs.,
P.C. v. Douglas, 710 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1983).
114. 439 U.S. 379, 409 (1979).
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abortions use the technique most likely to save the fetus provided "a different technique would not be necessary ... to preserve the life or health
of the mother.""' 5 According to the Court, the word "necessary" impermissibly suggested that a certain method of abortion must be "indispensable" rather than merely "desirable" to safeguard the woman's
health." 6 Since the statute did not explicitly state that the woman's life
and health must prevail in a conflict with fetal life and health, it left
physicians unclear as to their duties. In the absence of such a provision,
physicians might conclude that they were required to make a 'trade-off'
between the woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal
' 17
survival."'
The Supreme Court invalidated another Pennsylvania abortion statute in a 1986 case, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand
Gynecologists because, inter alia, it too might have required a woman to
bear an increased medical risk to save a viable fetus. 1 8 Certain provisions of the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon a woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion by subordinating constitutional
privacy interests and concerns for maternal health.
If the state may not compel "trade-offs" in postviability abortion
decisions, it is equally unconstitutional to compel "trade-offs" in delivery
decisions.I 9 When the health interests of a woman and her fetus conflict,
the state appears to be constitutionally bound to place the woman's interests above the fetus. Since the Supreme Court has never held that a fetus
is a "person" for purposes of the United States Constitution, the fetus
cannot logically possess rights which could trump the constitutional protections of an adult woman.
It seems clear that the state should not order a woman to risk her
health simply because cesarean delivery would increase the chances of
fetal survival. Yet the A. C. Court did just this. It required a woman in an
advanced stage of leukemia (at high risk in any surgical procedure) to
undergo a cesarean in an attempt to increase the chances that her twentysix week old fetus would live. Since the fetus was premature, had developed in a woman with cancer, and had been subjected to the harmful
effects of her medications, 120 its prospects were equivocal at best. Most
115. Id. at 397.
116. Id. at 400.
117. Id.
118. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
119. Rhoden, supra note 5 at 1992-93. Rhoden comments that "emergency situations do not
suffice to render subordination of woman to fetus constitutionally acceptable."
120. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 613 (D.C. App. 1987).
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women would not hesitate to risk surgery to safeguard their babies'
health. If they refuse, however, the abortion cases indicate that the state
should respect that refusal. In Mrs. Carder's case, the cesarean section
was abnormally risky and imposed great discomfort on an already suffering woman. 12 1 Her refusal stood firmly on health risk grounds. Indeed,
the operation may well have shortened her life.
Nonetheless, the A.C. Court dismissed this line of argument in a
footnote. 12 2 It reasoned that Colautti123 only prohibited criminal sanctions for doctors who performed postviability abortions to protect a woman's health.124 But this reading belies the plain language of the opinion:
"The statute does not clearly specify, as appellants imply, that the woman's life and health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health
when they conflict."' 25 As for Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists,12 the A. C. court distinguished it by claiming

that it referred only to women in "good health."' 27 The A. C. court felt
that the state could not permissibly "sacrifice" a healthy woman's "well-

being" for the life of her viable fetus, but it could sacrifice the well-being
of a sickly woman.12 8 Such reasoning seems counterintuitive. If the state

owes any woman special protection of her health, it is one who is desperately ill. Moreover, a cesarean will pose a more serious threat to a sickly

woman than to a perfectly healthy one. Surely, the risk of major surgery
for a terminally ill woman constitutes the legitimate health risk, which,
under Roe,' 2 9 should override concerns for fetal health.
121. Cesarean surgery involves a significant intrusion upon a woman's bodily integrity. Prior to
a cesarean, nurses shave a woman's pubic hair, insert a catheter into her bladder, and wash her with
an antiseptic solution. Regional or general anesthesia is administered, and the physician cuts vertically or horizontally through the abdominal wall and removes the baby. BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH
BOOK COLLECTIVE, supra note 2, at 384.
"The rest of the surgery is more difficult for the woman. There is more pain and women often
vomit and complain of difficult breathing as we handle their organs and repair the damage." See M.
HARRISON, A WOMAN IN RESIDENCE, 81-84 (1982).
The intrusion does not end with the operation. See 533 A.2d at 617 (citing 4C GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, 308.50 (3d.ed. 1987)): "The surgery presents a number of common
complications, including infection, hemorrhage, gastric aspiration of the stomach contents, and postoperative embolism .... It also produces considerable discomfort." See also CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH
at 260; Marieskind, Cesarean Section, 7 WOMEN & HEALTH 179,186 (1982).
122. 533 A.2d at 615 n.4.
123. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
124. 533 A.2d at 615 n.4.
125. 439 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added).
126. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
127. 533 A.2d at 615 n.4.
128. Id. The words, "sacrifice" and "well-being" are the court's.
129. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Although the abortion cases deal with statutory provisions rather
than individual court orders, the Constitution protects citizens from both
legislative and judicial violations of their rights. Court-ordered cesareans
clearly involve the coercive power of the state sufficient to constitute
state action. 130 As Professor Tribe has explained, "The general proposition that common law is state action-that is, that the state 'acts' when
its courts create and enforce common law rules-is hardly controversial.... . ,131 The emotional medical emergency present in In re A. C. cannot excuse court decisions which invert constitutional obligations by
trying to save the fetus at any cost to maternal life and health.13 2
III.

MEDICAL REFUSAL LAW

Courts which order cesareans tend to rest their decisions on a body
of medical refusal cases which suggests that adults may not deny their
children life-saving treatment. In so holding, courts are following the
general principle that while one may choose to place oneself at risk, one
cannot be allowed to choose a risk for someone else.
Medical refusal cases have emerged in two situations: first, where a
patient refuses consent to her own treatment, 13 3 and second, where a parent or guardian refuses treatment for a child. 134 When a court requires a
woman to undergo a cesarean, it is compelling a physical invasion of her
body, thereby involving a competent adult's right to refuse medical treatment. 135 However, the treatment is meant to benefit the fetus. If she refuses it, she is not denying herself care. She is denying it for the fetus, and
so the analogy is drawn to parents who withhold treatment from their
children. 136
130. See Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 34, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8,
1988)(No. 87-609).
131. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1711 (2d ed. 1988)(citing cases collected in
Barnett, What is "State"Action Under the Fourteenth,Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments ofthe
Constitution?,24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945)).
132. See Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1993-94.
133. See, eg., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972)(where court upheld religious freedom to
refuse blood tranfusion and would not appoint guardian to grant consent); Lane v. Candura, 6
Mass.App.Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J.Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785
(1978)(where court refused to appoint guardian for elderly patient and recognized privacy right to
refuse treatment regardless of prognosis); In re Melideo, 88 Misc.2d 974,390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct.
1976)(where court refused to order transfusion over objection of competent, non-pregnant woman
although she risked death).
134. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745-51,
370 N.E.2d 417, 427-30 (1977).
135. Note, Court-OrderedSurgery, supra note 5, at 126.

136. Id.
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Absent a compelling state interest, courts have generally held that a
competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment, even if death
will ensue.13 7 This right has been found in the patient's constitutional
rights to privacy13 8 and freedom of religion, 1 39 as well as the common
law right to self-determination and bodily integrity.140 To override a refusal of treatment, the state commonly has had to demonstrate an interest in protecting an innocent third party from the results of the refusal.
For example, in Raleigh Fitkin - PaulMorgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,"'H an oft-cited precedent for court-ordered cesareans, a pregnant
Jehovah's Witness refused blood transfusions necessary to save both her
life *andthe life of her fetus. The New Jersey Supreme Court decided that
the state interest in protecting the third party fetus overrode the woman's
right to practice her religious beliefs. In 1981, the Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed a Butts County Superior Court decree ordering a pregnant woman at term to submit to a cesarean notwithstanding her religious objection because both her life and that of her fetus were in grave

danger. 142
It has been widely held that an adult does not have the right to deny
her child necessary medical treatment, 14 3 and some jurisdictions have extended this doctrine to "unborn children." In two 1985 cases, the New
York Supreme Court has compelled pregnant women to receive blood
transfusions against their will for the benefit of their fetuses. 144 By contrast, in 1983, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated a lower
court judgment requiring a pregnant woman to undergo a surgical procedure, although without it she would probably miscarry. 145 The woman
137. Without informed consent, medical treatment constitutes battery. "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body..
"
Schloendorfv. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30,105 N.E. 92,93 (1914)(landmark case). See
generally Annotation, Patient'sRight to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93
A.L.R. 3D 67 (1979).
138. See, eg., In re Maida Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973).
139. In re Osbourne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Medileo, 88 Misc.2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d
523 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
140. See generally Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment, 13 CREIGFnTON L. REV. 795 (1980).
141. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
142. Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981), Sea
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
143. For examples of cases where parental treatment decisions have been honored, see F.
ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, § 5.16.2, at 316 (1984)(citing In re

Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972)).
144. In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc.2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Crouse Irving
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc.2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
145. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 334-35, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983).
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withheld her consent for religious reasons, and the court found no state
interest compelling enough to deny her the constitutional rights of privacy and free exercise of religion. 4 6 In a footnote, it added that it had
found no precedent for ordering a pregnant woman to submit to surgery
for the sake of a nonviable fetus. 147
In her survey of forced cesarean cases prior to In re A. C., Professor
Nancy Rhoden contends that the law must respect a woman's religious
objection to a cesarean. 148 Every case she cites (save one) and all of the
cases above concerned healthy women who refused consent on personal
or religious grounds.1 49 Professor Rhoden presents a forceful argument
that by vitiating individual choice, courts are imposing a tyranny of
medicine without sound legal footing.15 ° However, In re A. C. presents an
even clearer case, since Mrs. Carder had ample health grounds for refus151
ing the cesarean section.
Apparently, the only medical refusal case where a court was willing
to override a woman's health-based objection to a cesarean was a 1979
unreported Colorado case: In re Unborn Baby Kenner.152 In this case, a
Colorado woman was in labor when the fetal monitor began to indicate
fetal distress. Her doctors asked her to consent to a cesarean delivery, but
she refused, aware that her obesity increased her risk in a surgical procedure and fearful of the outcome. 153 Despite her health objection, she was
made to undergo the operation in order to protect the fetus. Although
this case more nearly resembles In re A. C. than the cases where a
cesarean stood to save both mother and fetus, or where a healthy woman
raised religious objections, the doctors in Kenner were at least trying to
save a term baby, not a high risk, premature fetus. Additionally, this
unreported Colorado Juvenile Court case had little chance of influencing
other courts and might be considered an anomaly. By contrast, In re A. C.
reached the appellate level in the District of Columbia and created considerable publicity. Thus, if the District of Columbia does not repudiate
the stance it took in A. C., that case stands to do far more damage to
146. Id.
147. Id. at 334 n.4.
148. Rhoden supra note 5, at 2007-08.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2030.
151. Cesarean surgery posed an above average risk to a woman in Mrs. Carder's condition. For
the history of Mrs. Carder's condition, see supra notes 17-80 and accompanying text.
152. In re Unborn Baby Kenner, No. 79 J.N. 83 (Colo. Juv. Ct. Mar. 6, 1979). See Bowes &
Selgestad, Fetal Versus MaternalRights: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBsTETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY 209 (1981).
153. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1959.
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reproductive rights than Kenner. One must question the wisdom of both
decisions.
A 1981 case, In re Unborn Baby Robles, reached an opposite result.1 54 Although the young, pregnant woman involved was dying of cancer, she had refused an abortion and was trying to continue her
pregnancy to term. In the event of cardiac arrest, however, she had requested that the doctors attempt to revive her before treating the fetus.
The obstetrics staff supported a court-ordered cesarean, but her other
doctors agreed that surgery would kill the woman. To resolve the conflict
in favor of treating the fetus first, social services officials asked the juvenile court to override the woman's wishes. As a prerequisite to any order
the juvenile court had to assert its jurisdiction over the fetus, and on
appeal, it was concluded that juvenile court jurisdiction did not extend to
fetuses.
The right of every pregnant woman to decide the course of her medical treatment falls under the rubric of well-settled common law right to
bodily integrity, and the courts should uphold it as such:
Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's first and greatest right,
which underlies all the others - the right to the inviolability of [her] person; in other words, the right to [herself] - is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon,
however skillful or eminent,. . to violate without permission, the bodily
integrity of his patient by a major or capital operation, placing [her] under
an anaesthetic [sic] for that
155 purpose, and operating upon [her] without [her]
consent or knowledge.
IV.

THE BONE MARROW TRANSPLANT ANALOGY

The state has no interest which justifies its imposition of a health
risk on one private citizen to benefit another. As comparison with bone
marrow transplant cases shows, the state never demands that one citizen
endanger her health to rescue another citizen. How can it then make this
demand of a pregnant woman for the sake of a fetus?
Very little case law involves performing a medical procedure on one
person to save the life of another. In fact, the common law imposes no
duty to come to the aid of a person in distress.1 56 There are, however,
154. No. J.-935192 (L.A. Cty. Super. Ct., Juv. Div., Sept. 1981)(unpublished opinion) cited in
Gallagher, supra note 2, at 47.
155. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (Minn. 1905), cited in Appellant's Amended Brief on
the Merits at 29, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No. 87-609).
156. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984).
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three exceptions to this rule. First, one has an obligation to render aid to
a person one injures or endangers.1 57 Second, one has a duty to perform a
rescue attempt with reasonable care once one embarks upon it so as not
to worsen the victim's position.' 58 Third, persons in special relationships,
159
including that of parent and child, owe one another a duty to rescue.
The obligation has only been held to require actions such as warning
someone of a danger,' 60 or calling medical or police personnel to the
scene.6 ' Even when there is a duty to rescue, the law never requires
rescues which jeopardize life and limb.' 6 2
In two recent cases, the courts have recognized the limitations on
the duty to rescue by refusing to order the dying plaintiffs' relatives to
submit to testing and donate bone marrow. McFall v. Shimp, 163 a Pennsylvania case, involved a man striken with aplastic anemia whose cousin
was the only possible donor. While the court condemned the cousin's
behavior, it found that he had no legal duty to rescue his relative. In
defense of its decree, the court called it "revolting" to imagine the state
forceably extracting living body tissue from one member of society in
order to sustain another member.' 64
In an equally tragic case, In re George, a man with chronic myelocytic leukemia needed a bone marrow transplant. 16 He had been
adopted at birth, and so, sought to open his adoption records in the hope
that his natural parents would prove to be compatible donors. The court
consulted his natural mother, but she was not a suitable donor. As for
the natural father, he refused to admit paternity and would not permit
medical compatibility tests. The court found that the parental duty to
rescue did not extend to medical procedures, and held that the dying
man was not entitled to learn his father's name (presumably so as to
approach him in person).
Although painful and intrusive, bone marrow extraction is far less
157. Id. at 377.
158. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 114 (1989).
159. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 8.3.1 (1978).
160. See, eg., Scatena v. Pittsburgh & New England Trucking, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 683, 319
N.E.2d 730 (1974)(holding that the driver of a disabled vehicle must warn oncoming traffic with
flares or by other means).
161. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1596 (1979).
162. "It would, therefore, be an extraordinary revision of American'law to require risky rescues,
even by a spouse or parent." Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1977.
163. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
164. Id. at 92.
165. In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App. 1982)(holding that the trial court's refusal to
open adoption records was not an abuse of discretion).
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risky than major surgery.16 6 Nevertheless, the courts have found that despite the dire circumstances of the plaintiffs, the state cannot mandate
intrusions into the defendants' bodies. Court-ordered organ donation,
is
which would require major surgery, is so clearly impermissible that it 67
deprivation.,
state
unconstitutional
an
of
example
traditional
a
as
used
It is certain that a court could not order a parent to donate bone marrow
in order to save a child's life.1 68 Yet courts order pregnant women to
submit to surgery for the sake of a fetus. This is illogical, for the born
child has constitutional rights, which the fetus does not, and the pregnant woman is subjected to a more dangerous, intrusive procedure than
the donor would experience.
The only exceptions to the rule that courts cannot order surgery are
transplant cases involving incompetents. Fetal rights advocates have
cited two such cases as support for court-ordered cesareans. However,
both courts ordered kidney transplants based on the best interests and
perceived wishes of the incompetents. 169 In Hart v. Brown, 170 a Connecticut court made a "substituted judgment" on behalf of the incompetent
based on psychiatric testimony that she wished to donate her kidney to
her twin. A Kentucky court, in Strunk v. Strunk,1 7 1 decided to authorize
the transplant based upon the close relationship between the incompetent
and his brother, and the probable "traumatic effect" 172 his brother's
death would cause. Thus, the two courts were trying to implement the
incompetents' wishes, not overriding their refusals as in In re A. C..
Unless a woman has been adjudicated incompetent, these cases seem
irrelevant to the coerced cesarean debate. To rely on such authority suggests that pregnancy renders women incompetent to exercise their right
to give informed consent to medical treatment, a deeply disturbing no166. Rhoden, supranote 5, at 1977; see L. KASS, BONE MARROW INTERPRETATION 389-91 (2d
ed. 1985).
167. Certain invasions are permissible if society and the individual both benefit from the duty.
However, invasions imposed for the benefit of one individual are not permissible. See L. TRIBE,

917-18 (1978).
In re Guardianship of Pescinski, a Wisconsin case, stands for the proposition that courts cannot
order organ donation. This court stated that it lacked the authority to order "a kidney transplant or
any other surgical procedure on a living person." 67 Wis. 2d 4, 5,226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1975)(refusing to compel a kidney transplant from an institutionalized mental patient to a younger sister).
168. Regan, supra note 155, at 1586.
169. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 26. See, e.g., In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1973)(using the best interests of the incompetent test).
170. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
171. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
172. Id. at 146.
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tion. 7 3 Yet, while making no finding as to competency, the trial judge in
In re A. C. treated Mrs. Carder as essentially incompetent. He allowed
others to testify as to whether she would consent, made no attempt to ask
her actual wishes before making his decision, and then characterized her
desires as "not clearly know[n]." 17 4
No other nonconsensual bodily intrusions of the scope of cesarean
surgery are permitted under the law. 7 The courts have allowed the state
to invade the bodies of its citizens in limited cases: to vaccinate against
epidemics, 176 to obtain evidence from criminal suspects, 17

7

and to treat

178

prisoners and mental patients.
However, these cases tend to involve
mandatory innoculations or blood tests. The courts have consistently approached more extensive intrusions with great disfavor. 179 For instance,
it has been held that state authorities may not administer drugs that induce vomiting either to criminal suspects (to recover swallowed evidence), or to
institutionalized persons (used for adverse conditioning
80
purposes).1
In an oft-cited 1985 case, Winston v. Lee, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of court-ordered surgery to retrieve a bullet from the
body of a robbery suspect. 81 The Court found that the surgery would
violate the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, explaining that the
"overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state."' 2 In
addition, the Court indicated that it found the notion of court-imposed
173. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 37.
174. Appellant's Amended Brief on the Merits at 17, In re A.C. (D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1988)(No.
87-609)(citing Record at 83-84).
175. Gallagher, supra note 2, at 20-21; Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1982.
The keystone to any intrusion upon the body of a person must be full, adequate and
informed consent. The integrity of the individual must be protected from invasion into
his body and personality not voluntarily agreed to. Consent is not an idle or symbolic
act; it is a fundamental requirement for the protection of the individual's integrity.
Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rep. 433, 477 (1973) cited in Gallagher, supra
note 2, at 17-18.
176. See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905)(upholding a Massachusetts compulsory smallpox vaccination statute as constitutional).
177. See Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966)(upholding compulsory blood alcohol test as
admissible in criminal conviction under Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
178. See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984)(holding that Massachusetts law permitting
giving antipsychotic medication to involuntarily committed mental patients against their will was
well above minimum due process standards).
179. Rhoden, supra note 5, at 1984.
180. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757; Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
181. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
182. Id. at 760 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767).
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anesthesia demeaning.18 3
Considering all of the precedent against such intrusions, it is all the
more striking that a District of Columbia court would compel a terminally ill woman to undergo nonconsensual surgery.
CONCLUSION

As in much of the current debate over women's reproductive rights,
the medical professionals and judges who support forced cesarean sections have focused heavily on the fetus, forgetting their legal obligations
to pregnant women. It is therefore crucial to remind them that while the
fetus has never been considered a "person" under the United States Constitution, pregnant women are guaranteed the full panoply of constitutional rights.
First, every state has a constitutional duty articulated in Roe v.
Wade to protect the life and health of the pregnant woman. It must never
sacrifice her health for the sake of a fetus. Second, the competent pregnant woman has a well-established common law right to bodily integrity
giving her the right to make all of her medical treatment decisions. The
state cannot override her refusal of medical treatment based on concerns
for an "innocent third party" that has no constitutional status. Third, the
law never imposes surgery on one citizen for another's sake, except in the
forced cesarean context. Although bone marrow extraction is less risky
than surgery, the courts have consistently refused to order this sort of
intrusion into any citizen's body without consent.
As for public policy, it is unwise to recognize fetal rights which
would create an adversarial relationship between a pregnant woman and
her fetus. By creating rights for the fetus which conflict with those of the
mother, our nation will drive an increasing number of women to fight the
fetuses within them in the courts. This is hardly likely to foster close
mother-child bonding after birth. Moreover, any balancing of fetal and
maternal interests rests on unavoidably uncertain medical diagnostic
techniques. Since medical emergencies demand a rapid response, it is not
feasible for the courts to determine which situations warrant intervention
as drastic as involuntary surgery.
Instead we must defer to personal and family decisions in the intimate sphere of reproduction. Although a pregnant woman has an ethical
obligation to accept reasonable medical treatment for the sake of the fetus, the state should not demand such a duty. When it does, the state
183.

470 U.S. at 765 (citing Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir. 1983)).
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645

strips the pregnant woman of her human dignity, treating her as a means
to an end. Those who seek to improve fetal health by legally coercing
medical treatment for pregnant women would better serve their purpose
by working to increase the availability of prenatal care for poor women.
Above all, no court should ever repeat the mistakes of the A. C.
court: in its solicitousness for potential life, it forgot its constitutional,
common law, and ethical obligations to the living.
JENNIFER BEULAH LEw

